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The Politics of Land Deals – A Comparative Analysis of Global Land Policies on Large-Scale Land Acquisition 
 
Abstract Due to current crises, large-scale land acquisition is becoming a topic of growing concern. Public 
data from the ‘Land Matrix Global Observatory’1 project demonstrates that since 2000, 1,622 large-scale land 
transactions2 in low- and middle-income countries3 were reported, covering an area of nearly 69 million 
hectares. The majority of these land deals, also referred to as ‘land grabs’, took place between 2008 and 2010, 
peaking in 2009. 
It is widely assumed that emerging economies, in search for alternative ways to secure future food and fuel 
supply are the major drivers behind the global land rush. New evidence however reveals that local and national 
governments and elites are largely initiating and facilitating these land deals, mainly driven by Western investors 
in order to meet (renewable) energy and commodity demands in the nearby future. 
Large-scale land acquisition often goes hand in hand with issues of displacement, weak governance 
structures, corruption, conflicts, and environmental damages. Several international organizations have taken the 
initiative in developing global land policies on large-scale land acquisition in an attempt to govern the global 
land grab. The effectiveness of these so-called ‘soft law' instruments is however increasingly being questioned. 
This paper therefore offers a comparative analysis on the effectiveness of global land policies on large-scale land 
acquisition, as developed by the European Union, the World Bank Group and consortium, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, and the African Union, embedded in a theoretical framework of effectiveness, soft law, 
and interrelations with transparency, accountability and legitimacy. Currently the FAO-CFS Voluntary 
Guidelines and the AU Framework & Guidelines are being implemented. The research is therefore focusing on 
the effectiveness of these two land policy frameworks. 
Evidence so far reveals that in practice global land policies on large-scale land acquisition can be problematic 
due to: 1) their ‘voluntary character’, 2) land deals are often initiated and facilitated by nationals (elites) and/or 
national governments, 3) (increasing) vulnerability of ‘customary land rights’, mainly due weak governance 
structures and shortcomings in the implementation of land reform policies, and 4) ‘emptiness of consultations’, 
hereby referring to the ineffectiveness of the Free, Prior and Informed Consent principles. 
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1 The Land Matrix database has undergone several updates since 2009 toward a public tool: The Land Matrix Global Observatory, hereby 
using an interactive map-based platform based on the concept of crowdsourcing (e.g., Anseeuw et al. 2012b; Land Matrix 2013; McLaren 
and Handja 2012). The public database covers land deals, with an area of 200 hectares or more, made for agricultural production, timber 
extraction, carbon trading, industry, renewable energy production, conservation, and tourism (Anseeuw et al. 2012a; Land Matrix 2013, 
2014). 
2 As of 6 May 2014: including 1,210 transnational deals (Concluded: 947, Intended: 186, Failed: 77) covering an area of more than 58 
million hectares, and 412 domestic deals (Concluded: 364, Intended: 31, Failed: 17) covering an area of nearly 11 million hectares (Land 
Matrix 2014). 
3 Country group categorization according to the World Bank classification system: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications. 
Accessed 6 May 2014. 
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Land deals are often part of a complex system, involving a wide range of actors (state and non-state) at different 
governance levels. The regions East Africa, West Africa and South-East Asia are mostly targeted while small-
scale farmers remain the mainly targeted group (Land Matrix 2013). Large-scale land acquisition is assumed to 
be a typical North-South problem, however increasingly driven by emerging South-South economies like Brazil, 
China, India and the Gulf States in search for alternative ways in securing their food and fuel supply in the 
nearby future. New evidence supports the argument that local and national governments and elites are largely 
initiating and facilitating these land deals, driven by European and Northern American investors in order to meet 
(renewable) energy and commodity demands in the nearby future (e.g., Deininger et al. 2011, p. 62; Faye et al. 
2011; Hilhorst et al. 2011; Cotula 2013), as stated by Cotula (2013, p. 11): ‘[i]t is mainly about meeting demand 
for energy and consumption goods in richer countries and about speculation linked to rising land values. Fuel, 
wood, fibre and finance, more than food, are the engines of the renewed interest in agricultural investments in 
the global South’.  
The European Union (EU) has set its own ‘20-20-20’4 sustainability target, including mandatory renewable 
energy targets to be achieved by 2020: 1) an overall share of 20% of the total EU energy consumption by 
renewables, 2) a minimum target of 10% for the share of biofuels, as a substitute for diesel and petrol, in the 
transport sector to be achieved by all Member States in 2020 (EU 2009). Since most land deals are biofuel 
oriented (§ 3.3), this could lead to price fluctuation and direct land use changes5 leading to an increase of CO2-
emissions, erosion, water shortages (Gerbens-Leenes et al. 2013) and food insecurity, hereby directly affecting 
local populations largely depending on their lands for food supply. After severe criticism, the EU published a 
proposal in October 2012 to limit global land conversion for biofuel production by means of limiting the 10% 
target to 5% (EU 2012). The aim of the proposal is to specifically focus on biofuels that deliver significant 
greenhouse gas (GHG) savings and to report indirect land-use change emissions. 
Specifically in Africa domestic investors, represented by local and national governments and elites, are 
initiating and facilitating large-scale land deals, hereby negatively affecting local communities and small-scale 
farmers (Cotula 2013)6. As stated by Borras and Franco (2010a, p. 519) ‘[…] it is at the local level that local 
elites and bureaucrats who stand to gain in new investments can easily manipulate negotiation processes and 
where local communities of the poor can easily be isolated from their potential national allies’ […] ‘power 
imbalances between social classes are likely to benefit local elites, not the rural poor’ (Borras and Franco2010b, 
p. 11). 
In an attempt to legitimize and regulate the global land grab, several major international organizations: the 
World Bank Group (WBG) and consortium, the Committee on World Food Security of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (CFS-FAO), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU) have developed ‘voluntary 
principles and guidelines’ (FAO et al. 2010; EU 2004; AU et al. 2010; FAO 2012), also referred to as 'codes of 
conduct' or ‘soft law'. The effectiveness of these voluntary guidelines is however increasingly being questioned 
due to: (a) their voluntary character, (b) a dramatic increase of the involvement of national actors, hereby 
outweighing ‘foreign’ investors, (c) an increase in the vulnerability of customary land rights, and (d) the 
                                              
4 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm. Accessed 6 May 2014. 
5 Woods and wetlands are however according to the EU Renewable Energy Directive (EU 2009) excluded for the production of biofuels. 
6 See also: http://www.iied.org/african-land-deals-policy-shift-underway. Accessed 9 November 2013. 
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negative connotation surrounding these principles, mainly caused by severe criticism from NGOs and civil 
society organization after the release of the 2009 WBG RAI Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments. 
2. Problem Definition 
The voluntary guidelines, as established by the four international institutions, are fore mostly seen by the 
WBG and other (foreign) investors as a new ‘development opportunity’ (Borras and Franco 2010a; FAO et al. 
2010; Deininger 2011; Deininger et al. 2011; Cotula 2013), in where ‘investors profit and ‘host’ nations benefit 
from economic development, improved agricultural infrastructure, and employment opportunities’7 (OI 2011, p. 
1). This ‘investment boost’ is often justified by (foreign) investors for several reasons: (1) institutional reform is 
the main driver behind this narrative, because it is assumed that targeted countries often have weak land 
governance8 systems (Deininger 2011), due to a ‘lack of clear property rights’, which discourages foreign 
investors (Borras and Franco 2010a; FAO et al. 2010),  (2) these Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are highly 
appreciated by the governments of ‘host countries’ (Zoomers 2011), and (3) land deals are often being justified 
because the land is categorized as ‘reserve agricultural land’ (Cotula et al. 2009). Questions can however be 
asked about the practical credibility of these statements.  
First, to start with the latter, evidence has shown that these so called ‘communal lands’, often referred to by 
investors as abandoned, unused, marginal, idle, underutilized or degraded lands, often belong to rural farmers by 
means of informal entitlements (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Cotula et al. 2009; Sulle and Nelson 2009; 
Borras and Franco 2010a; Cotula 2013). A wide range of literature furthermore shows that these informal local 
entitlements, often referred to as ‘customary rights’, have little legal ground and do not guarantee safety from 
land grabs910 (e.g., Cousins 2009; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010a; Alden Wily 2011, 2011b; Zoomers 2011; 
Cotula 2013). Evidence furthermore shows that poor countries with weak land governance structures are more 
frequently targeted by (foreign) investors (Anseeuw et al. 2012a; Arezki et al. 2013).  An explanation can be 
found in the fact that ‘investors are interested in countries that combine a strong general institutional framework, 
that protects their investment and allows them to smoothly operate their business, with low land tenure security 
that gives them easy and possibly cheap access to land’ (Anseeuw et al. 2012a, p. 11).  
Land in Africa is furthermore often owned by the state (Cotula 2011, 2013). The origins of current African 
weak local land governance structures date back to colonial history where (old) local legal rights were often not 
recognized by the colonial governments (Colson 1971; Cotula 2013). Cotula (2013, p. 120-121) furthermore 
argues that ‘[…] once a piece of land becomes of outside interest, legal options for local people to defend their 
rights, negotiate a fair deal and hold governments and companies to account are severely constrained, not only 
by entrenched power imbalances, but also by the weak rights that villagers have under both national and 
international law’, and ‘[…] the pace of the reforms that would be needed in order to put in place the required 
systems is likely to be painfully slow – because of politics as well as technical challenges’. And when projects 
fail the land is usually not returned to its original owners (Cotula 2013). Land expropriation due to LSLA is 
                                              
7 It is widely acknowledged that China for example usually brings its own people (e.g., Zoomers 2012). Based on the WBG report and 
research in Indonesia, Li (2011) elaborates further upon the labour perspective and concludes that poverty reduction is a very unlikely result 
of LSLA. 
8 ‘Land governance is understood as the formal and informal rules, mechanisms, processes and institutions through which land is accessed, 
used, controlled, transferred, and land-related conflicts are managed. It encompasses, therefore, land tenure systems, land and agrarian 
reforms, and land administration’ (Amanor 2012, p. 3). 
9 Personal communication with Prof. Pauline E. Peters, Center for International Development, Harvard University, 12 May 2013. 
10 See furthermore Cotula 2013, chapter 4 ‘Land grabbing in the shadow of the law’, for an extensive discussion on the influence and role of 
African law in land grabbing. 
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frequently being reported (Cotula 2013). The Land Matrix database mentions 40 cases of displacement 
(Anseeuw et al. 2012a)11. In Mozambique for example a planned 30,000 hectares park for sugarcane production, 
including job possibilities for the local community, has eventually led to the eviction and resettlement of the 
villagers. The promised land was allocated to a private investor (Cotula 2011), although Mozambican law is 
supposed to protect local land rights (for example through mandatory local consultations), even if they are ‘not 
formally registered’ (Alden Wily 2011; Cotula 2013, p. 90). Alden Wily (2011, p. 35) blames this partly on the 
‘lack of institutional coordination’ of the Mozambican government. In China, where most of the land is owned 
by the state, land expropriation due to domestic land grabbing has led to forced migration of rural populations to 
urban areas (Siciliano 2012). In India land transactions are often concluded by means of the involvement of a 
‘second partner’, which make the initial investor, and subsequently the investment, untraceable12. This could be 
an explanation for the fact that the Land Matrix database only registered 10 (foreign) investment deals in India 
(Land Matrix 2014, as of 6 May 2014). 
Next to the negative connotation surrounding land reform policies, they can also lead to ‘[…] significant 
shifts in the balance of power in state–people property relations’ (Alden Wily 2000, p. 1): ‘[…] the nature of 
state power itself is altered, each time settling a little nearer to the landholder, who in turn is forced and 
empowered to be a little less passive in his or her relation to the state’ (ibid, p. 4). Exceptions to the rule, where 
land reform seems to have a positive outcome for the rural communities, are: Benin, Burkina Faso, and Tanzania 
in where ‘[…] community-level land bodies are both democratically elected and endowed with significant 
powers, including the regulation of land disposition within the local area and issuing certificates of title to 
landholders’ (Alden Wily 2011, p. 57). 
The above reveals how complex land deals in practice are13. Although several initiatives to protect local land 
rights through land reform policies and projects were taken, in practice14, local governance structures often 
remain weak due to ‘shortcomings in implementation’ (De Jager, 2009; Alden Wily 2011; Cotula 2013, p. 27).  
There were many attempts to strengthen customary land rights through law and land reform policies, 
however often not very successful15. As argued by Cotula (2013, p. 91-92), ‘[…] local rights remain weak and 
insecure, partly because of gaps in legislation’ and ‘[…] even where local rights are protected, national law 
typically enables the government to expropriate land for commercial projects’.  
Criticism by NGOs and civil society organizations is mainly focussed on the WBG helping corporations and 
investors invest in cheap land in developing countries at the expense of local communities, the environment, and 
farm groups (Vidal and Provost 2012). This argument is strengthened by the strategy of the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), and the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), both part of the WGB, providing 
technical as well as advisory services to governments in developing countries, promoting an ‘efficient land 
market’ strategy, encouraging developing countries in simplifying processes, which makes it relatively easy for 
                                              
11 25 cases have led to evictions of 1,000 people or more, which includes 10 cases of the eviction of more than 10,000 people (Anseeuw et al. 
2012a, p. 41-42, Figure 26). 
12 Interview with M.G. Bastos Lima, PhD student at the Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 
conducted on June 28, 2012. 
13 Borras and Franco (2010b) offer an analytical guideline into the complexities of current land policy discourses, including etymological 
discussions. 
14 For case study examples see: Malawi: Peters and Kambewa 2007, Sierra Leone: Peters and Richards 2011, South Africa: Hall 2009, 
Tanzania: Shivji, 1998, Uganda: Green 2006 (Green focuses mainly on the role ethnicity played in the failure of land tenure reform in 
Buganda, Central Uganda), Zimbabwe: Scoones et al. 2011, Hillhorst et al. 2011 for a survery in Benin, Burkina Faso & Niger. 
15 Based upon a study of more than 70 laws in Eastern and Southern Africa. Another paper by Alden Wily (2003) examines land 
decentralization processes in 20 countries in East, West and Southern Africa. Cotula (2011) explores in detail the key features of land deals 
(who is involved: Fig. 1, p. 20) and their wider legal frameworks, based on an analysis of 12 land contracts in Africa. 
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foreign investors to gain access to land (Daniel and Mittal 2010; De Schutter 2011a). FDI are furthermore 
encouraged due to the protection of investors’ rights, under international law under investment and trade 
agreements, strengthening hereby […] the legal value of individual contracts by making their violation a breach 
of international law’ (Graham et al. 2010, p. 6). Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT), and Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) are example of such instruments, highly promoted by the EU. The BITs ‘usually include 
provisions that strengthen the legal power of the investors’, and ‘[…] subsequently weaken the policy space for 
national states and the power of host local communities’ (Graham et al. 2010, p. 6). The EPAs ‘[…] provide 
further incentives for land grabbing by curtailing the respective States’ policy space to protect their resources 
and markets for domestic use’ (Graham et al. 2010, p. 6). 
Despite efforts of the WBG to regulate various crises since 2008 with proper policies, these measurements 
are in fact ‘[…] leading to trends that increase instability rather than provide security and opportunity’ (Daniel 
and Mittal 2010, p. 30). 
Some scientists remain quite skeptical of a code of conduct for several reasons. First of all they are ‘not 
embedded in a political analysis of how they might actually work in practice’ (Borras et al. 2011, p. 210). The 
WBG report furthermore ‘does not address the fundamentally important questions of who wins, who loses and 
why, and what are the social, political, and ecological drivers and consequences of these processes?’ (Borras et 
al. 2011, p. 210). Next to the ‘reserve land’ and ‘land property rights’ discussion, CoCs Codes of Conduct are 
mainly criticized by scientists on the following aspects: (1) ‘The food and energy investments brought about by 
the recent mega land deals will not solve the food and energy crises in the world and might even worsen them’, 
(2) The assumption that decentralized-localized formal and transparent multi-stakeholder land transactions are 
the solution to avoid negative effects of large-scale land deals is only partly correct. The representation of social 
groups is particular problematic, since local elites often seize power. (3) Violations are difficult to make 
accountable due to the voluntary character of the COCs, and (4) An unrealistic vision on ‘partnerships’, 
‘assumed to promote transparency and build win-win outcomes into any land deals’ (Borras and Franco 2010a, 
p. 515-521). Zoomers (2010, p. 443) advocates that ‘processes of land grabbing are broader and deeper than 
assumed, and codes of conduct or contractual arrangements will neither help to stop nor turn the tide’, because 
‘many countries neither have legal or procedural mechanisms in place to protect local rights, nor take into 
account local interests, livelihoods or welfare’. 
 
The recently endorsed FAO-CFS Voluntary Guidelines (VG) and the African Union Framework and 
Guidelines are seen as an important step to combat ‘land grabbing’, albeit not exclusive. Most parties agree with 
combining a code of conduct, principles and/or guidelines for global land policies with (existing) binding 
instruments of international human rights law. Combining the FAO VG with national and international 
enforceable laws and regulations on land investments and related policy fields like trade is also frequently 
mentioned, next to the incorporation of the 2006 ICARRD principles. 
 
Considering the above, this paper therefore focuses on answering the following research question:  
‘How effective are, and under what conditions can Global Land Policies on Large-Scale Land Acquisition be 
effective?’ 
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3. Global Land Policies (GLP) 
3.1.  Introduction 
Due to the problems arising from LSLA, several multilateral institutions have developed Global Land Policies 
(GLP) in an attempt to govern the ‘global land grab’. In 2004 the European Union (EU) has developed 
Guidelines for support to land policy design and land policy reform processes in developing countries (EU, 
2004). The World Bank Group (WBG) developed their RAI Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments 
in 2009, in consortium with FAO, IFAD and UNCTAD (FAO et al., 2010), based on an already existing Code of 
Conduct framework for foreign land acquisition by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
(Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). Regional and national initiatives started to emerge as an answer to the 
developments in the international land policy discourse. The African Union developed, in 2009, jointly with the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), a ‘Framework and 
Guidelines on Land Policy’ to strengthen land rights, enhance productivity and secure livelihoods (AU et al. 
2010). 
 
Table 1 Establishment Global Land Policies EU, WBG, FAO-CFS, AU. 
 EU (LPG) WBG (RAI)* AU (F&G) FAO (VG) 
Endorsed 2004 2009 2009 2012 
Sources: EU 2004; AU et al. 2010; FAO et al. 2010; FAO 2012 
*Not formally endorsed, the status of the RAI Principles still remains ‘draft’ 
 
On May 11th, 2012, during its 38th session, the FAO Committee on World Food Security (CFS) has endorsed 
the ‘Voluntary Guidelines on the Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of National 
Food Security’ (FAO, 2012). 
 
3.2. European Union Land Policy Guidelines 
In 2004 the European Union developed ‘EU Land Policy Guidelines’ to support land policy design and land 
policy reform processes in developing countries (EU 2004). The EU land policies focus primarily on ‘land 
policy reforms’, since ‘[l]and policy reform can make substantial contributions to poverty reduction, in removing 
obstacles on access to land for the poor, in giving them legal rights and access to credit through collateral, in 
giving people access to assets and economic opportunities linked to agriculture or natural resources, in 
forbidding land grabbing, encroachment and other processes of exclusion’ (EU 2004, p. 20). The EU key 
principles for a successful land policy design are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: EU key principles for successful policy design 
No. Principle 
1 Learn from local land policies to encourage greater growth, equity or environmental sustainability 
2 Long term processes 
3 Promote inter-ministerial work, with in-depth analysis of current situations 
4 Promote a participatory approach to policy making 
5 Take into account the distance between statutory law and local practice 
6 Identify key principles and allow for diverse solutions within them 
7 Take implementation costs into account in the design of land tenure reform measures 
8 Carefully craft the rules and tools 
9 Recognize that the impact of reform depends on changes in practices and not on the legal texts alone 
10 Ensure widespread dissemination of information on the scope and content of the reform as well as on the policy, legislation and 
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procedures 
11 Gender issues need a careful approach 
12 Policy provision to increase access to land by women must be accompanied by the necessary support mechanisms to enable them to 
access, control and utilize land successfully 
13 The rights of minorities and indigenous peoples are to be adequately recognized 
14 Land policy has to include sound land use planning 
Source: EU 2004, p. 17-19 
The EU report underlines the important relationship of land tenure with other major policy areas (poverty 
reduction, citizenship, human rights & social justice, gender equality, agricultural development, conflicts & post-
conflict recovery, land administration and governance, local government & decentralization, taxation, 
environment, and land use planning), and the role of different stakeholders (central & local government, private 
sector, civil society groups, local communities, and donors) in implementing land policies (EU 2004).  
 
3.3. WBG Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investments (RAI)  
In 2009 the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) initiated the concept of a ‘code of conduct’ for 
foreign land acquisition (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). Building further upon the IFPRI Code of Conduct 
(Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009), the 2003 ‘Land Policy Framework’, and an in-dept study ‘Large-Scale 
Acquisition of Land Rights for Agricultural or Natural Resource-based Use’, which started in 2009 in 20 most 
targeted countries and focussed specifically on the policy framework and social, economic, and environmental 
impact analysis, (FAO et al. 2010), four major international organizations: WBG, FAO, IFAD and UNCTAD, 
joined together to develop seven ‘Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, 
Livelihoods and Resources’ (Table 3), also referred to as the RAI Principles (RAI 2012). It is however important 
to notice that the WBG RAI principles have never been formally endorsed (CFS 2011a). 
 
Table 3: WBG RAI Principles 
No. Aim Principle 
1 Respecting land and resource rights Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are recognized and 
respected. 
2 Ensuring food security Investments do not jeopardize food security but strengthen it. 
3 Ensuring transparency, good governance, 
and a proper enabling environment 
Processes for acquiring land and other resources and then making associated 
investments are transparent and monitored, ensuring the accountability of all 
stakeholders within a proper legal, regulatory, and business environment. 
4 Consultation and participation All those materially affected are consulted, and the agreements from consultations 
are recorded and enforced. 
5 Responsible agro-investing Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect industry best practice, 
are economically viable, and result in durable shared value. 
6 Social sustainability Investments generate desirable social and distributional impacts and do not 
increase vulnerability. 
7 Environmental sustainability Environmental impacts of a project are quantified and measures are taken to 
encourage sustainable resource use while minimizing and mitigating the risk and 
magnitude of negative impacts. 
Sources: FAO et al. 2010; Deininger et al. 2011 
 
3.4. African Union Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy 
In April 2009 African Union Heads of State adopted the ‘Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy: a 
Framework to Strengthen Land Rights, Enhance Productivity and Secure Livelihoods’, a joint initiative by the 
African Union (AU), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the UN Economic Commission for Africa 
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(ECA), with the aim ‘to promote Africa’s socioeconomic development, through inter alia, agricultural 
transformation and modernization’ (AU et al. 2010, p. xi). The Land Policy Initiative (LPI) and the European 
Union help in facilitating the implementation of the guidelines (AU et al. 2010; Graham et al. 2010).  
 
Table 4: AU Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa 
No. Element 
1 Offer a basis for commitment by African member states to the formulation and operationalization of sound land policies as a basis 
for sustainable human development that includes assuring social stability, maintaining economic growth and alleviating poverty 
and protecting natural resources from degradation and pollution. 
2 Promote consensus for shared principles as the basis for securing access to land for all users, enhancing agricultural productivity 
and sustaining livelihoods. 
3 Underscore the need for popular participation in land policy formulation and implementation so as to facilitate improved 
governance of land resources. 
4 Suggest standards for best practices for land policy reforms and benchmarks for the performance of land institutions that member 
states can adopt in keeping with their respective contexts. 
5 Articulate a policy framework for addressing emerging issues and anticipating future trends relating to land resources. 
6 Provide a basis for more coherent partnership between states, citizens and development partners in land policy formulation and 
implementation on the continent. 
7 Establish general principles for engaging development partners for the purposes of mobilizing resources for building capacities for 
transformative land policy reform processes. 
8 Develop guidelines for regional convergence on the sustainable management and utilization of land and associated resources shared 
by two or more member states in various parts of Africa. 
Source: AUC et al. 2010, p. 2 
 
Next to providing a framework with guidelines (Table 4), the document also offers an historical, political, 
social and economic insight in African land policies. The framework and guidelines have been compiled through 
an extensive consultation process, which started in 2006, involving the participation of African stakeholders 
ranging from civil society organizations, NGOs, government agencies, Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), practitioners and researchers. 
 
3.5. FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests 
The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) is one of the governing bodies of the UN FAO (CFS 2012), with 
the aim to coordinate a global approach to food security. In 2009 the CFS has improved its institutional structure 
by including a wider group of stakeholders to gain more strength in promoting food policies worldwide. The 
‘Voluntary Guidelines (VG) on the Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of 
National Food Security’ seek to improve the governance of land tenure and fisheries and forests, with a specific 
focus on vulnerable and marginalized people (FAO 2012).  
The VG are subdivided into seven main parts that can be read as operational guidelines, based on five 
General Principles for Responsible Governance of Land Tenure (FAO 2012, p. 3): (1) Recognize and respect all 
legitimate tenure right holders and their rights, (2) Safeguard legitimate tenure rights against threats and 
infringements, (3) Promote and facilitate the enjoyment of legitimate tenure rights, (4) Provide access to justice 
to deal with infringements of legitimate tenure rights, and (5) Prevent tenure disputes, violent conflicts and 
corruption. Guidelines for the implementation process are given in Table 5.  
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Table 5: FAO-CFS Principles of Implementation 
No. Principles of Implementation Description 
1 Human dignity Recognizing the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable human rights of all 
individuals. 
2 Non-discrimination No one should be subject to discrimination under law and policies as well as in practice. 
3 Equity and justice Equality between individuals may require acknowledging differences between 
individuals. 
4 Gender equality Ensure the equal right of women and men to the enjoyment of all human rights. 
5 Holistic and sustainable approach Recognizing that natural resources and their uses are interconnected, adopting an 
integrated and sustainable approach to their administration. 
6 Consultation and participation Engaging with and seeking the support of those who, having legitimate tenure rights, 
could be affected by decisions. 
7 Rule of law Adopting a rules-based approach through laws consistent with national and international 
law, and voluntary commitments. 
8 Transparency Policies, laws and procedures in applicable languages and formats accessible to all. 
9 Accountability Holding individuals, public agencies and non-state actors responsible for their actions 
and decisions according to the principles rule of law. 
10 Continuous improvement Improvement of mechanisms for monitoring and analysis of tenure governance by states 
to develop evidence-based programmes and secure on-going improvements. 
Source: FAO 2012, p. 4-5 
 
The VG were established, taking into account existing frameworks addressing ‘human rights’ and ‘tenure 
rights’, such as the RAI principles (CFS 2011b), the ‘Minimum Human Rights Principles’, developed by UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food in 2009, to ‘address the human rights challenge of large-scale land 
acquisitions and leases’ (De Schutter 2009; 2011a, p. 253; CFS 2011a), the ‘Voluntary Guidelines on the Right 
to Food’, and the ICARRD Principles (FAO 2012). The VG guidelines were developed as a result of an 
extensive consultation process, regionally as well as worldwide, amongst a wide range of actors from the public 
and private sector, civil society and academic world (FAO 2009, 2012). 
4. Theoretical Framework 
4.1. Soft Law 
As stated in the introduction, the global land policies under investigation are based on voluntary non-binding 
commitments, also referred to as ‘soft law’.  
Nowadays most international law can be considered as ‘soft’ (Abbott and Snidal, 2000), a result of the 
development and expansion of a ramified framework of institutions after WWII, a rapid increase of the ‘UN 
family’ of organizations, an increase of NGOs, and the evolution of the world economy and state 
interdependency (Dupuy 1991, p. 420-421). Abbott and Snidal (2000) argue that international actors often 
decide on purpose to use softer forms of legalization, as superior to ‘hard law’. The soft law concept fits within 
the current dynamics of a decentralized and globalized world, as formulated by Dupuy more than twenty years 
ago (1991, p. 534): ‘soft law is a sign and product of the permanent state of multilateral cooperation and 
competition among the heterogeneous members of the contemporary world community’. 
Soft law can be subdivided in two categories: ‘legal soft law’ and ‘non-legal soft law’ (Chinkin 1989).  Legal 
soft law refers to norms in the form of treaties, including ‘soft’ obligations. Non-legal soft law refers to non-
binding or voluntary resolutions and instruments like ‘codes of conduct’, broadly accepted and often embedded 
in international principles.  
Depending on its applicability, soft law instruments vary in their level of abstraction; they either have a high 
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level of abstraction and generality or are very specified and ‘extremely narrow in subject matter’16 (Chinkin 
1989, p. 852). The latter seems to benefit the effectiveness of the instruments. According to Kolk and Van Tulder 
(2005, p. 9) ‘[t]he more specific the codes are, the better can they be measured and, subsequently, monitored’, 
and conversely monitoring is ‘expected to enhance codes’ comprehensiveness and compliance likelihood’. 
Skjærseth et al. (2006) explore the relationship between soft law, hard law and institutional effectiveness. 
One of their main conclusions is that ‘[…] ambitious norms are more easily achieved in soft law institutions than 
in legally binding ones’, mainly due to ‘the greater flexibility offered by soft law instruments’ (Skjærseth et al., 
p. 118). 
 
4.2. Transparency, Accountability and Legitimacy 
The shift toward more decentralized governance systems in the last decades brings problems of transparency, 
accountability, and legitimacy (Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2001, 2004; Biermann and Gupta 2011). Climate 
change, as a relatively new challenge, will put a severe pressure on these institutions. Particularly issues of 
accountability and legitimacy are still an underdeveloped research area in current global climate governance 
discourse (Biermann and Gupta 2011). These three elements, their complexities and inter linkages are important 
determinants toward more effective climate governance regimes. 
 
Transparency 
Transparency is of great importance in negotiations over land deals. According to Cuffaro and Hallam (2011, p. 
1) ‘the lack of transparency and incompleteness of contracts’ in large foreign land deals is problematic, as 
several case studies imply (ch. 3.2). Transparency of administrative processes by means of a clear format for 
information reporting is mentioned as a solution to increase transparency, additionally it enhances the process, 
reduces transaction costs and the likelihood of conflicts (Deininger et al. 2011).  
In theory governance transparency mechanisms interrelate with disclosure of information strategies and 
initiatives (Gupta, 2010; Mitchell, 2011). Transformative potential of governance by information disclosure is 
however limited, but can work in conjunction with other mechanisms (Gupta, 2010).   
Mitchell (2011) distinguishes two types of transparency for governance policy mechanisms: (1) disclosure-
based transparency, and (2) education-based transparency. Both aim at influencing an actors’ behaviour through 
information dissemination. Mitchell (2011, p. 1889) concludes that the influence of both strands is quite small 
since ‘[…] information is usually a weak cause of behaviour’. 
 
Accountability 
Accountability refers to ‘the willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one's actions’ (Biermann 
and Gupta, 2011, p. 1857). 
Within accountability theories an important distinction can be make into internal and external accountability, 
in where external accountability is related to normative assumptions as in ‘[…] people outside the acting entity, 
whose lives are affected by it’ (Keohane 2002, p. 14-15). According to Keohane (2002) the condition of being 
affected is not valid to create a claim an sich. With respect to external applicability of transnational accountable 
‘entities’, in the context of international organizations, Keohane (2002) discusses the widespread belief that 
                                              
16 Chinkin (1989) hereby refers to (1) the 1981 WHO International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes (WHO 1981), and (2) the 
FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides 1985 (FAO 2003).  
 12
these organizations can be ‘held accountable’ for their actions by civil society organizations and NGO’s, 
representing ‘the affected’. These normative claims can lead to more legitimacy and transparency in institutional 
policies and processes. 
Translated toward practical applicability, accountability can be directly linked to issues of ‘procedural 
fairness’, by means of: (1) transparency and information sharing; (2) monitoring and reporting mechanism; (3) 
balanced representation of stakeholders (‘participatory accountability’) (Bäckstrand, 2008, p. 98). 
 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy can be linked to norms, rules, sanctions, and legality. According to Schouten and Glasbergen (2011) 
legality is an important precondition for legitimacy. Legitimacy can be described as ‘[…] being in accord with 
established legal norms and requirements, or conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules and 
standards of behaviour’ (Biermann and Gupta, 2011, p. 1858). 
With respect to (formal) land rights, Deininger (2003, p. xxiii) argues that specifically in Africa ‘the gap 
between legality and legitimacy has been a major source of friction, something that is illustrated by the fact that 
often more than 90 percent of land remains outside the existing legal system’ due to ‘failure to give legal 
backing to land administration institutions that enjoy social legitimacy’. Institutions however have also proven to 
be ineffective if they are in fact legal, but without social recognition. 
An interesting distinction within the legitimacy discourse is between input and output legitimacy. Output 
legitimacy (i.e. governability) refers to the level of success of specific policies (in this case) as a precondition for 
being legitimate (Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004). 
 
4.3. Effectiveness 
Research on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes has been subject to debate in global 
environmental governance literature for over 30 years (Young 2011). In solving environmental problems, 
governance systems seem to work well on the national level, but overall fail on international, transnational, and 
global levels (Young 2011). An institution can be considered effective if it meets the following criteria: (1) 
changes the behaviour of states and member parties in an intended direction, (2) solves the (environmental) 
problems it was designed to solve, and (3) do so in an efficient and equitable manner (Bernauer 1995, p. 358).  
Based upon the previously defined theories of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, for this research, the 
Bernhauer's definition will be applied as global land policies being considered effective under the following 
conditions (1) proper disclosure of information in the global land policy process is leading to more transparency 
and behavioural changes17;  (2) institutions being held accountable for their actions by civil society organizations 
and NGO’s, thus seen as more successful (i.e. legitimate); (3) these normative claims subsequently lead to more 
legitimacy and transparency in institutional policies and processes. 
5. Institutional Framework 
Methodologically, this research is based on a comparative analysis, testing the effectiveness of global land 
policy schemes from four institutions: (1) the European Union, (2) the World Bank Group and consortium, (3) 
the Food and Agriculture Organization, and (4) the African Union.  
                                              
17 Behavioural change can in this context be understood as the result (outcome) of implementing a regime (Miles et al. 2001), in the context 
of this research, referred to as a global land policy regime. 
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The research question will be tested dependently as well as independently in the pursuit to achieve optimal 
results. A comprehensive institutional framework (dependent analysis) therefore forms the basis of this research. 
A literature review will seek to find explanations for the effectiveness of GLP qualitatively (independent 
analysis). 
 
5.1. Key Variables & Operationalization 
In order to make a statement on the effectiveness of Global Land Policies, this chapter offers an institutional 
framework, in where, based on theoretical evidence, the dependent and independent variables and corresponding 
criteria and indicators have been defined. An institutional framework (Table 7) forms the basis for the 
institutional analysis. A positive ‘causal’ correlation between the independent variables x1, x2, x3, et cetera and 
the dependent variable effectiveness (y) has led to the formulation of twelve hypotheses under the following 
conditions: 
 
‘The more x, the more y’18 
 
The twelve hypotheses can be defined as:  
h1 = The higher the transparency (x1) of the institutions’ Global Land Policies the more effective; 
h2  = The more legality (x2) the institutions’ Global Land Policies embrace, the more effective; 
et cetera. 
5.1.1. Independent variables: The Institutional Framework 
The institutional framework for analyzing and comparing global land policies for the four IOs (EU, WBG, FAO 
& AU) is presented in Table 7. Based on a literature review19, the x variables (set of causal combinations) are 
divided into three main clusters: ‘Content’, ‘Participatory’, and ‘Measure’. 
5.1.2. Dependent variable: Effectiveness 
Referring back to the formulated research question, y is hereby defined as Effectiveness of Global Land Policies. 
Explanations for effectiveness can be found qualitatively. Based on a state-of-the-art literature review, social and 
environmental criteria of effectiveness have been selected (Table 6). 
 
All four criteria are interrelated, therefore the inter linkages will be discussed, specifically with regards to the 
impact and effects of large-scale land transactions on targeted countries and affected populations, groups, and/or 
individuals. 
Table 6: Social and Environmental Criteria of Effectiveness 




1 Support of the poor 
2 Ensuring energy security 
3 Prevent displacement (loss of livelihoods) 
4 Environmental sustainability 
Source: author’s own interpretation 
                                              
18 It is expected that a reverse construction (the less x, the more y) will be applicable for H7 (addressee): the less global, the more effective. 
19Kolk and Van Tulder (2005) developed a comprehensive model to analyze and compare ‘codes of conduct’ for international organizations. 
This model was first introduced in 1999 (Kolk, Van Tulder, and Welters). In developing an institutional framework for global land policies 
parts of this model have been used, specifically with regards to the classification framing of the hypotheses: h5, h6, h7, h11 & h12, categorized 
under the ‘operationalization’ section in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Institutional framework to analyze and compare Global Land Policies on Large-Scale Land Acquisition 














Quality of Standards 1) Transparency 1) Transparency in negotiations, and contracts; 
availability of, and access to information 
2) Legality20 2) Regulatory requirements/legality (norms/rules) 
available, including the legal protection of local land 
rights 
3) Technical guidelines 3) Level of direct applicability of the GLP principles 
and guidelines 
4) Specific in subject matter 
 
4) Level of detail: Extremely narrow and specific in 
subject matter (Chinkin 1989, p. 852; Kolk and Van 
Tulder 2005, p. 9)  






Level of quantification: % of issues quantified: >90% 
(predominant); 51%-90%- (majority); 25%-50% 
(medium); 10%-25% (minority); <10% (few); none 
(no) 

















Addressee Geographic scope / focus group 
 
Focus group/area of the established criteria/principles.  
global (weak); nearly global (low); general region 
(moderate); specific country (strong). 
Role of government 
(local/national) 
Local, national involvement Involvement of local/national governments in the 
establishment of the criteria/principles 
Participation Stakeholders involvement21 (proper)consultations to create a wider support: local 
(land owners), (principles local consultation: Cotula et 
al. 2009, p. 105), national/ governmental (FAO 2003), 
regional, NGOs 
Implementation Level of implementation (criteria), and 
operationalization 
1) Formulation of operational criteria or guidelines; 2) 










Monitoring Monitoring system embedded in 
criteria 
Good insight into system and process (clear); reference 
to some parts, but criteria or timeframes are lacking 
(clear to vague); only general reference to monitoring 
without details (vague) 
Sanctioning Sanctioning mechanism embedded in 
criteria 
See monitoring 
Source: authors’ own analysis, based on: Chinkin 1989; Kolk, Van Tulder, and Welters 1999; Van Tulder and Kolk 2001; FAO 2003; EU 
2004; Kolk and Van Tulder 2005; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Cotula et al. 2009; AU et al. 2010; FAO et al. 2010; Deininger et al. 
2011; Meier 2011; OI 2011; FAO 2012; Polack et al. 2013. 
* Focus not only on production of food and biofuels for export purposes (although most important according to Land Matrix database (Land 
Matrix 2013, see also §1.1), but on all seven processes driving the current ‘global land grab’ (Zoomers 2010, p. 434-440): (1) Offshore 
farming: FDI in food production, (2) FDI in non-food agricultural commodities and biofuels, (3) Development of protected areas, nature 
reserves, ecotourism and hideaways, (4) SEZs (Spezial Economic Zones), large-scale infrastructure works, urban extensions, (5) Large-scale 
tourist complexes, (6) Retirement and residential migration, and (7) Land purchases by migrants in their countries of origin. The Tanzanian 
government and private partners invest for example largely in tourism in its own country (Gardner 2012; Land Matrix 2013). An argument 
for investing in tourism is that it ‘offers possibilities for rapid economic growth’ (Zoomers 2010, p. 438). 
                                              
20 This indicator is closely related to the stakeholder involvement indicator. Polack et al. (2013, p. 15) identify (1) Recognition of customary 
rights, and (2) Consultation or FPIC legally required as a condition for land allocation, as preconditions for the ‘legal protection of local land 
rights’ (indicator of political and legal accountability). 
21 FAO et al. (2013, p. 8) identify FPIC as ‘a key component of effective stakeholder engagement and consultation’. 
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Social criteria 
There is growing evidence that climate change puts a severe burden on agricultural productivity (Cotula et al. 
2009; Hertel et al. 2010; IFPRI 2012: 39), leading to droughts, water shortages, food insecurities, eventually 
resulting in the loss of livelihoods. 
Competition over land and weak tenure governance can deteriorate into serious conflicts, leading to all sorts 
of problems (OI 2012b). People are often forced from their ancestral lands by corrupt governments, while land is 
being leased (often for a long period) to foreign companies, increasing poverty and hunger. According to 
Breisinger et al. (2012, p. 32) ‘[…] natural resource scarcity plus projected strong impacts of climate change 
may also exacerbate conflicts’. A recent survey by Global Witness (2012) finds a sharp rise in killings over land 
and forests in the last decade, specifically in Brazil, Peru, Colombia and the Philippines.  
The 2008 food crisis has led to a ‘global rush’ for land to secure countries’ energy and food supply in the 
near future, leaving specifically Arab countries extremely vulnerable to water and food insecurities (Breisinger 
et al. 2012; IFPRI 2012, p. 80-81). African countries are increasingly affected due to water scarcity, as a result 
from climate change and land transactions (GRAIN 2012b; Prateek 2012). When there is little opportunity left 
for the inhabitants due to land loss, this often leads to increased levels of food insecurity, malnutrition, and 
migration to areas or countries with better living conditions. In order to support the poor sharing of benefits and 
respect for local land rights are of major importance, as illustrated by the Sierra Leone Malen case study (OI 
2012b). Securing local land rights can offer farmers a valuable asset for negotiation (Vermeulen and Cotula 
2010; Cotula et al. 2011). Business models can offer opportunities for smallholder farmers ‘in countries where 
government land policy has created strong incentives for business to work with local groups’ (Cotula et al. 
(2011, p. 110). Vermeulen and Cotula (2010) offer a review of business models that can provide opportunities 
for smallholder farmers. Land policies are an important element towards poverty reduction, stable governance, 
economic growth, and environmental sustainability (Deininger 2003). 
Adherence to national trade policy (and/or land policies) makes it possible to respect a country’s national 
rights. Export restrictions could for example be significant when national food security is at risk due to a 
disaster. Food security can also be in danger when local ecosystems are not taken into account, as for example 
was evident for the Malen case study in Sierra Leone (OI 2012b). 
 
Environmental sustainability 
Large-scale land transactions are often accompanied by changes in land-used. Considering the risks climate 
change brings toward the earth’s climate and society, this extra burden needs not to be taken into serious 
consideration (e.g. Foley et al. 2005). Mapping and measuring the agricultural impact of land transactions 
through environmental and social impact analysis can be a useful tool (Cotula et al. 2011; UNEP 2011; OI 
2012b). Based on empirical evidence from a multi-country study in Africa, Cotula et al. (2011, p. 104) state that 
‘several countries require an environmental impact assessment (EIA) or an environmental and social impact 
assessment (ESIA) to be carried out prior to project approval’. To ensure environmental sustainability, UNEP 
(2011, p. 6) also advocates for the implementation of EIAs, supplemented by ‘social impact assessments and 
periodic, independent inspection […]’. 
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6. Comparative Analysis 
The institutional framework (Table 7), combined with a literature review of the original global land policy 
documents, has resulted in an institutional matrix as shown in table 8 (dependent analysis). Subsequently the 
twelve defined hypotheses have been tested qualitatively in a dependent as well as independent analysis. The 
total result of the institutional analysis is presented in table 9. 
 
6.1. Dependent analysis 
An institutional framework (Table 7) has been developed in where twelve hypotheses, spread over three clusters 
have been tested dependently: (1) ‘Content’: transparency, legality, specifity, guidelines, issues, and time; (2) 
‘Participatory’: addressee, government, stakeholders, and implementation; (3) ‘Measure’: monitoring, and 
sanctioning.  
Both the FAO-CFS and AU score relatively high with respectively scores of 9.0 and 10.0 out of 12.00, 
corresponding with 75% and 83% coverage of the total score.  The EU scores quite moderate with 65% (7.75 out 
of 12), and the WBG ranks lowest with 42% (5.0 out of 12). 
The dependent analysis implies that the EU, FAO-CFS, and AU guidelines are most effective, basically 
because the three organizations take the implementation process more seriously, by, inter alia, (1) the 
involvement of a wide range of stakeholders, which enhances a successful implementation, and (2) the inter 
linkages with other relevant policy areas like gender issues, poverty reduction and environmental security. No 
sanctioning mechanisms were found in the principles and guidelines, however all organizations link to some 
form of compliance with legal systems, like human rights law (Table 8 Legality). 
The EU scores particularly very high on specifity of the guidelines and stakeholder involvement. The 
operational guidelines specifically focus on the role of stakeholders and donors in the implementation process of 
the guidelines. 
Although the WBG principles advocate for ‘respecting land and resource rights’ (Principle 1), serious 
improvements can be made in the development of a legislative framework. Other improvements can be made on: 
the applicability of the principles (‘guidelines’), the establishment of an adequate timeframe, and the 
development of an implementation, monitoring, and sanctioning mechanism. The geographical scope of the 
principles is furthermore too broad. 
The FAO VG have obtained the second highest score, mainly to due to transparency in procedures, a high 
level of stakeholder involvement, specifity (i.e. narrowness in subject matter) of the guidelines, and a high level 
of issues addressed; next to fisheries and forests, inter alia, food security, equity & justice, gender, human rights, 
sustainability. The FAO VG furthermore discusses states’ involvement and role in land transaction procedures 
widely, and focuses on strengthening local governments. The FAO has also developed principles for 
implementations, and uses multi-stakeholder platforms at local, national, and regional level to monitor the 
implementation, and impact of LSLA deals.  
The AU framework and guidelines scores highest, mainly due to the clear description of procedures, and a solid 
historical background and inter linkages with other policy areas. The criteria are more regionally focussed 
(Northern, Eastern, Southern, Central and West Africa), and more specific in subject matter, which, as 
theoretical evidence implies, largely benefits the effectiveness. 
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Table 8 Institutional Matrix Independent Variables 
 Variables 
 









x1  Transparency transparent procedures & transparent and 
accountable land acquisition schemes 
- clear and transparent procedures 
- major role for civil society in helping to 
  improve transparency 
policies, laws and procedures in applicable 
languages and formats accessible to all  
- institutions responsible for land 
  governance act transparent/accountable 
- effective tracking mechanism  
x2  Legality legislative framework: historical background, 
local land rights & law, socio-political rights, 
applicability of law 
- respect existing land and resource rights 
- policies, laws, and regulations affecting 
  investment climate benchmarked  
- consistence with international rights law 
- legal recognition and allocation of 
  tenure rights and duties 
- harmonization with existing laws 
- provision of affordable and legally 
  secure land and housing rights 
x3  Specifity detailed, overview of links with other policy 
areas, and overview major issues, trends, and 
priorities per region 
low, issues briefly discussed detailed, inter linkages with issues of human 
dignity, non-discrimination, gender, 
environment, equity & justice 
detailed, with a specific focus on  the African 
regions 
x4  Guidelines  key principles for policy design & donors 
(response strategy/set of interventions) & 
operational guidelines, high applicability 
principles for responsible agricultural 
investment, weak applicability 
operational guidelines; general principles & 
implementation principles, high applicability 
framework & guidelines, high applicability 
x5  Issues land policy reform,  gender equality, human 
rights, social justice, conflicts, environment, 
poverty reduction  
land policies, institutional reform, rights, 
livelihoods, resources, food security, 
environmental sustainability 
besides land tenure, focus on fisheries and 
forests, and important issues addressed in 
implementation principles 
‘people-driven land policies’ and reform, land 
rights, productivity, livelihood, environment, 
gender issues, tourism 
x6  Time In context of timetable by governments for 
consultation & donor interventions 
None none - realistic timeframe government for 
  policy review & adjustments 
- roadmap for a ‘land policy framework’  
  instead of timetables 













x7  Addressee developing countries 
 
lower income countries and rural areas vulnerable and marginalized people African countries; regional, local 
 
x8  Government 
 
encourage governments to participate with 
civil society, local communities, farmers 
- provide investors with adequate inform. 
- involvement of local governments 
- governmental protection vulnerable gr. 
- states’ role is widely discussed, as being 
  responsible for taking governance 
- strengthening local governments 
- central role of African governments to 
  ensure sustainable livelihoods 
- enhance dialogue with stakeholders 
x9  Stakeholders land policy reform participatory; civil society, 
private sector, local communities 
extensive consultation process, involving a 
broad selection of stakeholders 
participatory, involving a wide range of 
stakeholders local/national/regional 
extensive consultation, involving the 5 regions, 
experts, ministers, civil society 
x10 Implementation operational guidelines to assess national 
policies and design an EU response strategy 
n/a: the principles still need to be translated 
into concrete actions for investors, 
governments, donors & IOs 
- principles of implementation 
- CFS global forum for assessing progress 
   on implementation of the guidelines 
- implementation facilitated by LPI/EU 
- tracking principles 
- standards for best practices/benchmark 









x11 Monitoring - support monitoring and evaluation of 
impact of reform. 
- ‘outcome indicators’ preferred 
- civil society engagement 
- independent monitoring of principles, 
  guidelines, governance frameworks 
- environmental sustainability:  
  implementation monitoring 
- monitoring implementation & impact 
  LSLA agreements 
- multi-stakeholder platforms/frameworks 
  at local, national & regional level 
- tracking principles 
- monitoring the effects of land policy 
- land-related participatory monitoring & 
evaluation (PME) systems  







Sources: EU 2004; AU et al. 2010; FAO et al. 2010; FAO 20
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 * Outcome analysis dependent variable 
 
6.2. Independent analysis 
The selected criteria for the dependent variable (y) are specifically designed to make an independent statement 
on the effectiveness of GLP, regardless the outcome of the institutional analysis. Four ‘Social & Environment’ 
criteria have therefore been in order to identity the ‘social & environmental’ commitment of the GLP toward: (1) 
support of the poor, (2) ensure food security, (3) prevent displacement, and (4) environmental sustainability. The 
outcome of the independent analysis (Y variable) is summarized in Table 9.  
In summary can be concluded that most arguments, as derived from a literature review, work in favour of the 
African Union Framework and Guidelines (++), and the FAO-CFS Voluntary Guidelines (+). The WBG RAI 
principles and the EU land policy guidelines are highly contested. The independent analysis shows that most 
arguments, as derived from a literature review, work in favour of the African Union Framework and Guidelines, 
















x1		Transparency	 0.75	 0.75	 0.75	 0.50	
	
x2		Legality	 0.75	 0.50	 0.75	 0.75	
	





x4		Guidelines		 0.75	 0.25	 1.00	 1.00	
	
x5		Issues	 0.75	 0.75	 1.00	 1.00	
	
















0.75	 0.75	 1.00	 1.00	
	
x9		Stakeholders	 1.00	 0.75	 1.00	 1.00	
	







x11	Monitoring	 0.75	 0.25	 1.00	 1.00	
	

















	 Effectiveness	(Y)*	 ‐‐	 ‐‐	 +	 ++	
Classification Independent versus Dependent Variables  
0.0 / -- = None 
0.25 / - = Weak (vague, mild) 
0.50 / +/- = Low (weak to vague) 
0.75 / + = Medium (moderate, clear to vague) 
1.00 / ++ = High (clear, severe, strong)  
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contested.  
The EU guidelines are highly criticized for promoting land transactions by enhancing the investors climate, 
offering legal protection for investors under international law, in the form of investment and trade agreements to 
secure property rights, hereby weakening the policy space for national states and the power of host local 
communities.  
The WBG RAI principles are highly criticized, particular by civil society, smallholder farmers and NGOs for 
a lack of transparency in the process, a lack of stakeholder involvement, and a lack of a clear vision for the 
future. This has led to the adoption of the ‘Dakar Appeal against land grab’ in 2011 by social movements, faith-
based groups, environmental, development, and human rights organizations worldwide, advocating for a definite 
rejection of the RAI Principles by the Commission on Food Security, and restitution of lands that have been 
taken away from local communities illegally. The FAO VG specifically focus on worldwide ‘food security’, 
currently highly contested by civil society organizations who advocate for ‘food sovereignty’. The debate is 
undergoing. The conjunction of the FAO VG with the WBG RAI principles has been subject of debate. 
The AU framework and guidelines on land policy in Africa can help strengthening the position of national, as 
well as local governments, and local communities. They can bridge the gap between investor and host countries, 
by capacity improvement in negotiations of those representing the host country or local communities. Next to the 
EU, the LPI is assisting member states in implementing the AU guidelines, to achieve socio-economic 
development, peace & security, and environmental sustainability, hereby enhancing the likelihood of successful 
implementation of the framework and guidelines. 
Although not specifically reflected in the outcome of the analysis by any of the institutions, the environment 
is often at risk when land is being leased or sold. The agricultural impact of LSLA deals therefore needs to be 
mapped before land deals are being closed. Environment and social impact assessments could be a useful tool in 
measuring the impact of land deals. 
In summary can be stated that civil society, NGOs, and scholars strongly oppose the endorsement of the RAI 
principles. The recently developed FAO-CFS Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, can, together with the AU Framework and 
Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa, be seen as an important step toward regulating global land transactions, 
albeit not exclusive.  
The analysis was however somewhat restricted, due to a lack of adequate non-biased literature on the EU land 
policy guidelines, the FAO voluntary guidelines, and the AU framework and guidelines on land policy. 
7. Conclusion 
The Land Matrix database is to date the most comprehensive data source on large-scale land transactions 
worldwide, although its legitimacy can be questioned due to the usage of crowdsourcing data. This study has 
focused on the effectiveness of and the conditions for effective global land policies (GLP), as established by the 
WGB, FAO, EU, and AU, in the context of current land policy debate and large-scale land transaction discourse. 
The conditions for effective GLP have been constituted through an extensive institutional framework with 
underlying political theories. Criteria for effectiveness have been defined based on theories of transparency, 
legitimacy, and accountability, taken into account that it is likely to assume that each governance mechanism or 
system requires a different design: (1) proper disclosure of information in the global land policy process is 
leading to more transparency and behavioural changes; (2) institutions being held accountable for their actions 
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by civil society organizations and NGO’s, thus seen as more successful (i.e. legitimate); (3) these normative 
claims subsequently lead to more legitimacy and transparency in institutional policies and processes. 
It is however usually only possible to make a statement on the actual change of behaviour and 
(environmental) impact ‘after several years of operation’ (Miles et al. 2001, p. 6). Since the FAO voluntary 
guidelines, and the AU framework and guidelines on land policy are currently being operationalized, it is 
difficult to make a statement on all three proposed conditions.  
 
The African Union Framework and Guidelines, and the FAO Voluntary Guidelines, with possibilities for mutual 
cooperation, are most likely to succeed in effectively regulating large-scale land transactions in the near future. 
Both the WBG RAI principles, and EU guidelines are highly criticized for facilitating land grabs by enhancing 
the investors climate, (1) offering legal protection for investors under international law, for example in the form 
of investment and trade agreements to secure property rights, and (2) encouraging developing countries in 
simplifying processes, making it relatively easy for foreign investors to gain access to land, at the expense of 
local communities, the environment and farm groups. Strengthening and increasing the protection of local rights 
under for example international law could be a solution. African countries have already taken the initiative to 
strengthen local and customary rights protection. Securing local land rights can offer farmers a valuable asset for 
negotiation. Business models can offer opportunities for smallholder farmers (incentives in land policies for 
businesses to work with local groups is a precondition). 
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